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With the recent enactment of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 ("RFRA"),' which essentially overruled the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v Smith,2 much attention has been
focused on the appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating Free
Exercise Clause claims. Prior to the Smith decision, cases such as
Sherbert v Verner3 and Wisconsin v Yoder4 seemed to make clear
that laws adversely affecting religious practices were subject to a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, at least as they applied to the
religious practices so affected. Smith, however, rejected the
compelling state interest standard of Sherbert and Yoder for the
vast majority of free exercise claims-those involving the applica-
tion of a facially neutral law. In fact, under the Smith majority's
formulation, such incidental infringements on religious liberty do
not even give rise to a free exercise claim. The response to the
Smith decision, particularly Justice Scalia's characterization of
prior case law, has been overwhelmingly critical,5 with a few
notable exceptions,6 and is epitomized by Congress's attempt to
restore the pre-Smith case law through RFRA.
Unfortunately, many advocates of RFRA and of a return to
the pre-Smith compelling state interest approach are as guilty of
t BA 1993, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of
Chicago.
1 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (Supp 1993).
2 494 US 872 (1990).
374 US 398 (1963).
4 406 US 205 (1972).
For a list of some of the scholarly criticism of Smith, see James E. Ryan, Smith
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va L Rev 1407,
1409 n 15 (1992).
6 See, for example, William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revi-
sionism, 58 U Chi L Rev 308 (1991); William P. Marshall, The Cases Against the Constitu-
tionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W Res L Rev 357 (1989-90); Mark
Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L Rev 117.
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mischaracterizing precedent as was the majority in Smith. Any
candid review of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence leading
up to Smith leaves one with the impression that no clear and
consistently applied standard existed.! In far too many cases
claiming to apply heightened scrutiny to laws infringing on re-
ligious practices, particularly those of religious minorities with
practices outside of the mainstream Judeo-Christian tradition,
the Court did little more than pay lip service to its compelling
state interest standard;8 indeed, at times it did not even do
that.9 If anything stands out from the decades of case law apply-
ing the potentially sweeping language of the Sherbert-Yoder
standard, it is that religious minorities almost always lost."
This Comment argues that the vast majority of commentary
debating the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to religious
claims has, in an important respect, missed the point. The cen-
tral flaw in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence is much
deeper than, and is antecedent to, its choice of scrutiny level or
balancing test and is therefore not resolved by RFRA. Although
RFRA restores the heightened scrutiny framework to free exer-
cise claims, it neither resolves nor addresses this more funda-
mental error: an incomplete understanding of what religious
exercise entails, particularly for less conventional minority
religions.
The Court's current conception of the free exercise right is
incomplete because it fails to account adequately for the funda-
mental role religious practice often plays in defining and, more
importantly, expressing individual and group conceptions of
' In Smith, the majority noted that the Court's application of Sherberts compelling
state interest standard in religion cases had not been consistent. 494 US at 882-89. For a
thorough review of the Court's jurisprudence in this area, see Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1413-
16 (cited in note 5).
8 See text accompanying notes 17-23.
9 For cases refusing to apply a compelling state interest standard to free exercise
claims, see Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503, 506-10 (1986) (deferring to military
determination banning wearing of yaTmulkes by servicemen); Lyng v Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 US 439, 450-51 (1988) (building road over sacred areas did
not burden religious beliefs); OLone v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 348-50 (1987)
(sustaining a prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend wor-
ship services); Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 699-701 (1986) (requiring disclosure of a Social
Security number for welfare benefits did not burden religious beliefs); Alamo Foundation
v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290, 303-06 (1985) (imposing a minimum wage requirement
does not burden religious believers who refuse, for religious reasons, to accept wages).
10 The scorecard for religious claimants under the Sherbert-Yoder compelling state in-
terest standard is telling. See Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1413-17, 1458-62 (cited in note 5)
(stating that in the Supreme Court free exercise claims have lost in thirteen of seventeen
cases, and in the circuit courts they have lost in eighty-five of ninety-seven cases).
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identity. Consequently, whatever analytic framework the Court
employs to balance state interests and religious freedom, be it
strict scrutiny or rational basis review, the results are too fre-
quently skewed in favor of the state. Thus, it is the Court's point
of initiation rather than its method of operation that leads it to
systematically undervalue religious liberty. Accordingly, a strict-
er balancing test is simply not sufficient; what is needed is a
fuller vision of what religious exercise often means to those
engaged in it-one that takes into account the deeply symbolic
and expressive nature of religious practices and the fundamental
and defining role such worship plays in shaping human identity.
Filling in this incomplete understanding of religious exercise
requires a more systematic method of articulating the injury an
individual sustains when her free exercise rights are infringed.
In finding the basis for such a fuller understanding, proponents
of a stronger Free Exercise Clause could learn something from a
rather unlikely source: sexual orientation theorists.
Recent developments in sexual orientation legal theory,
specifically the concept of "identity speech," might help establish
a theoretical framework for a fuller vision of the. free exercise
right. The theory of identity speech combines two powerful
aspects of sexual orientation arguments: the fundamental role
sexual orientation plays in defining identity; and the expressive
nature of the "conduct" involved. Publicly expressing one's status
or membership in a class or group that is central to one's identi-
ty, even if that expression takes the form of openly engaging in
the activities that define the group in question, is at the core of
political speech. Indeed, the argument goes, such self-identifying
expression should be the most protected form of speech because
prohibiting it does the most damage to the individual.
Thus, in arguing for a fuller understanding of religious
exercise, this Comment explores the parallels between religion
and sexual orientation and identifies developments in sexual
orientation legal theory that might contribute to a more complete
vision of the free exercise right. Section I traces the development
of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence to illustrate the need
for a fuller understanding of religious exercise. Section II exam-
ines the parallels between religion and sexual orientation, focus-
ing on both individual and group characteristics. Section III
develops recent trends in sexual orientation legal theory, focusing
on First Amendment challenges to laws and official policies
restricting gay and lesbian "conduct." Lastly, Section IV exam-
ines the effects of applying the "identity speech" concept in free
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exercise jurisprudence. It concludes that such an application
illustrates the errors in judicial approaches to religious claims
and provides a broader and more equal protection to religious
claimants, particularly religious minorities.
I. STATUS OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Development of Free Exercise Doctrine before Smith
In its earliest application, the Free Exercise Clause proved
but a parchment barrier to statutes codifying massive hostility
against religious minorities. In Reynolds v United States, for
example, the Supreme Court held that Congress could impose
criminal sanctions against the Mormon practice of plural mar-
riage." In so deciding, the Court relied on a perceived distinc-
tion between religious belief and conduct, stating that "[1aws are
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac-
tices."'
Such an artificial distinction between religious belief and
practice fails to recognize that for many believers religion is as
much a matter of conduct as of belief. Often the two simply can-
not be disentangled. Because the free speech provision of the
First Amendment already protects freedom of belief, whether
secular or religious, a reading of the Free Exercise Clause that
does not protect at least some religiously based conduct offensive
to the majority's sensibilities leaves that provision devoid of any
practical consequence. Such an interpretation is particularly
untenable when one considers that it is the religious practices of
unpopular minorities that the state is most likely to restrict and
are therefore the most in need of protection.
However, the Court gradually retreated from this constricted
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. In Cantwell v Con-
necticut, it announced that the free exercise right was not limited
to protection of belief but extended to the "freedom to act," al-
though to a significantly lesser degree. 3 According to the Court,
1' 98 US 145 (1878).
Id at 166. The opinion also relies on the assertion that "polygamy leads to the pa-
triarchal principle, and... when applied to large communities, fetters the people in sta-
tionary despotism." Id. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S Ct 2217, 2245-47 (1993), asserts that Reynolds may still
be valid, since the state's interest so framed meets the Sherbert-Yoder test.
'3 310 US 296, 303-04 (1940). Cantwell is also notable as the opinion that "incorporat-
ed" the Free Exercise Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
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freedom of belief was "absolute," while conduct could be regulated
"for the protection of society" so long as the state did not "unduly
[]infringe the protected freedom.""
The high-water mark of free exercise protection came with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Sherbert in 1963 and Yoder in
1972. With these decisions, the Court seemed to make clear that
the Free Exercise Clause did have a protective sphere of its own
that extended beyond that of other First Amendment freedoms.
In Sherbert, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause com-
pelled South Carolina to grant unemployment benefits to a Sev-
enth Day Adventist unable to find employment because she re-
fused to work on her Sabbath. Applying a test that involved both
the "compelling state interest" and "least restrictive alternative"
standards, the Court concluded that even an "incidental burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified [only]
by a 'compelling state interest.'" 15
Applying a similar analysis, the Court in Yoder held that
Wisconsin's facially neutral, generally applicable law requiring
compulsory school attendance for all children under age sixteen
violated the free exercise rights of Amish families. According to
the Court, "[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on
the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion." 6
However, of the various free exercise cases arising after
Yoder in which courts applied the potentially sweeping language
of the Sherbert-Yoder test, remarkably few resulted in victories
for religious claimants, particularly religious minorities." Using
the highly manipulable balancing test Sherbert and Yoder estab-
lished for free exercise jurisprudence, 8 courts repeatedly exag-
gerated the weight of the governmental interest by speculating
about a parade of horribles that would follow a decision adverse
to that interest, excessively worrying about the ability to detect
feigned religious devotion, and defining the state's interests at a
higher level of generality than the constitutional interests on the
other side of the balance. Thus, while claiming that only interests
thereby requiring its application to the states. Id.
14 Id.
" 374 US at 403, quoting NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438 (1963).
16 406 US at 215.
'7 See note 10.
18 See Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond. Alternatives for the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 1981 Utah L Rev 309, 341-44.
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of the "highest order" 9 could justify a burden on religious liber-
ty, the Court upheld state regulations that were justified by such
interests as the uniform application of laws and administrative
convenience.20 As several observers have noted, the Court's ac-
ceptance of such relatively flimsy state justifications indicates
that it was not applying a genuine "compelling" interest test.
21
Perhaps the best example of the Court overstating the
government's interest while systematically understating the
scope and centrality of religious exercise is Prince v Massachu-
setts. In upholding the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for
violating child labor laws by taking her teenage niece out prose-
lytizing on the public streets of their small town, the Court
placed on the government's side of the balance "the interest of
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be [ ]
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunity for growth" and
protected from the "crippling effects of child employment," even
though few if any of the evils typically associated with child labor
were present.23 No such inflation was made on the individual
free exercise side of the balance. Indeed, the Court failed even to
recognize the central and defining role proselytizing plays in the
way in which a Jehovah's Witness worships her God.
In addition to manipulating the balancing test by relaxing
the compelling interest standard, courts have simultaneously
heightened the level of burden necessary to state a free exercise
claim. Before a free exercise claim can be examined under the
compelling interest standard, the claimant must show that her
religious beliefs or practices have actually been burdened. Often,
this is no easy task. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Ass'n, the Supreme Court held that no constitutionally recog-
nizable burden on Indian religion resulted from the building of a
12 Yoder, 406 US at 215.
" See, for example, Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 707 (1986) (citing administrative con-
cerns in rejecting free exercise challenge to federal regulation that required welfare re-
cipients to provide Social Security numbers); United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 258 (1982)
(ruling that the federal government has a compelling interest in the uniform application
of the Social Security system).
21 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109, 1110 (1990) ("[Alt the Supreme Court level, the free
exercise compelling interest test was a Potemkin doctrine."); Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1413-
16 (cited in note 5) (reviewing the poor record of free exercise claimants before the Su-
preme Court). See also EEOC v Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Co., 859 F2d
610, 624 (9th Cir 1988) (Noonan dissenting) (expressing regret over the Supreme Court's
failure to apply genuine strict scrutiny analysis to religious claims).
321 US 158 (1944).
Id at 165, 168 (citations omitted).
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road through a Native American sacred site.24 Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor reasoned that a constitutionally recog-
nizable burden on religion can only exist if the government action
has a "tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs."25 This was so even though the government
action in question "could have devastating effects on traditional
Indian religious practices."26 Thus, courts rarely recognize gov-
ernment actions that make religious exercise more expensive or
inconvenient, 27 or that do not force the claimant to forego an
"important" benefit,' as burdens sufficient to warrant compel-
ling interest review.
In other cases involving Native American challenges to the
use of publicly owned sacred land sites, courts have added to the
burden inquiry the additional element that the particular site be
"central" or "indispensable" to the claimants' religious prac-
tices.29 In Sequoyah v Tennessee Valley Authority, for example,
the Sixth Circuit held that the flooding of Cherokee holy places,
ancestral burial grounds, and ceremonial medicine gathering
sites did not sufficiently burden the free exercise rights of the
Native American claimants to warrant judicial scrutiny absent a
showing that the particular valley to be flooded was "indispens-
able" to their religious practices." Furthermore, in Wilson v
Block, the D.C. Circuit defined "indispensable" to mean that
unless the Native American claimants could show that the
government's proposed land use "would impair a religious prac-
2 485 US 439 (1988).
SId at 450.
' Id at 451.
See, for example, Messiah Baptist Church v County of Jefferson, 859 F2d 820, 824-
26 (10th Cir 1988) (holding that because zoning laws that made the claimants' religious
practices "more expensive" did not place an "undue burden" on their free exercise rights,
compelling interest analysis was not required); Smith v North Babylon Union Free School
District, 844 F2d 90, 94 (2d Cir 1988) (rejecting the claim of an orthodox Jewish student
who objected to the holding of graduation ceremonies on Saturday, his Sabbath, and
stating that state action that "simply makes the practice of his religion more difficult than
the practice of other religions ... is not the type of burden on core religious freedom ris-
ing to the level of a violation of the free exercise clause").
See, for example, Smith, 844 F2d at 93.
For a discussion of the judicial treatment of Native American religious claims, par-
ticularly the additional burden requirements of centrality and indispensability, see Com-
ment, After the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal Protection for First
American Worshipers, 24 NM L Rev 331, 335-42 (1994).
620 F2d 1159 (6th Cir 1980). In order for relief to be granted, the court required a
showing that worship at the particular site in question was "the cornerstone of [Native
American] religious observance" or that it played "the central role in their religious
ceremonies and practices." Id at 1164.
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tice that could not be performed at any other site," they failed to
raise a First Amendment claim. Because no free exercise claim
was recognized, the court did not even inquire into the
government's interest in developing the land.3'
Regardless of one's views on the merits of these cases, one
must recognize that courts have clearly manipulated the burden
requirement to reach particular results. When combined with a
loose application of the compelling interest standard, this judicial
manipulation leaves religious claimants, particularly religious
minorities, in a rather unenviable position. In order to establish
a burden, religious claimants must show that the government
involvement or interference with their religious practices is intru-
sive enough to potentially coerce them into violating their faith.
Yet given what often passes for "compelling" interests in these
cases, the mere existence of such extensive regulation could sig-
nify that the government has a sufficient interest in the law or
practice in question." In practice, then, demonstrating "coer-
cive" regulation only adds to the government's claim of compel-
ling interest. Conversely, less coercive government action, al-
though indicative of a lesser governmental interest, makes it un-
likely that the burden inquiry will be satisfied. Thus, for the reli-
gious claimant, to satisfy one requirement is often to demon-
strate failure of the other."3 It is therefore not surprising that
most free exercise plaintiffs, and virtually all religious minorities,
find themselves on the lighter end of the judicial balance even
though it is purportedly tilted in their favor.
B. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Whatever one makes of the stingy application of the compel-
ling state interest test under Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v Smith marked a significant shift in free
exercise jurisprudence. Although the parties in Smith neither
questioned nor argued the validity of the Sherbert-Yoder test, the
Court abruptly and unexpectedly denied that it had ever existed,
and appears to have returned to a reading of the Free Exercise
'1 708 F2d 735, 743-45 (DC Cir 1983).
See, for example, Townley, 859 F2d at 624 (Noonan dissenting) (stating that the
mere fact that Congress has chosen to address a problem through federal legislation has
often been construed as sufficient evidence of a compelling interest).
' For a discussion of this "catch-22," see Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1416 (cited in note 5).
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Clause similar to that adopted in Reynolds.34 In upholding the
denial of unemployment compensation to members of the Native
American Church who were discharged for admitting their use of
peyote during a religious ceremony, Justice Scalia, writing for the
five-member majority, asserted that the Court had "never held
that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate."35
Under the majority's view, as long as legislatures discipline
themselves through the equality principle-passing only general-
ly applicable laws not facially singling out religion generally or
any particular religion-they must be permitted to act and legis-
late in an across-the-board fashion.5 Furthermore, the democrat-
ic process will protect the interests of religious minorities." As
Justice Scalia noted, "a number of States have made an exception
to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use."" The implicit
assurance was that Oregon would likely follow suit once the
press had publicized the plight of the Native American Church
membership.39
Perhaps most disturbing was the Court's treatment of twen-
ty-five years of case law applying the Sherbert-Yoder standard.
According to the majority, "[t]he only decisions in which we have
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exer-
cise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of par-
ents to direct the education of their children."4" Thus, under
Smith's "free exercise plus" standard, strict scrutiny applies only
when religious practices commingle with another independently
See text accompanying notes 11-12.
Smith, 494 US at 878-79. Justice O'Connor authored a concurring opinion arguing
that the compelling state interest test was the appropriate standard but that the state's
interest in fighting the war on drugs sufficiently met this burden. Id at 905-07. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented, agreeing with Justice
O'Connor that the compelling state interest test should be applied but concluding that the
state had failed to make such a showing. Id at 907-09, 918.
Id at 879-82.
The majority apparently forgot the days when the Oregon state legislature decided,
in a fit of anti-Catholic fervor, to effectively abolish all parochial schools through generally
applicable legislation. See Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925).
" Smith, 494 US at 890.
Indeed, Oregon has since enacted an exemption for the sacramental use of peyote.
See Or Rev Stat § 475.992(5) (1993).
'0 Smith, 494 US at 881 (citations omitted).
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protected right; an infringement on religious exercise by an oth-
erwise general law standing alone is simply not sufficient to
warrant heightened judicial scrutiny.
It is now clear that Smith will not be the Court's last word
on this issue. President Clinton has recently signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act into law, which passed both houses of
Congress by overwhelming margins.4 1 RFRA represents the po-
litical rejection of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope
of the free exercise right in Smith. Essentially, it seeks to restore
the status quo ante Smith by requiring that a government action
may substantially burden an individual's exercise of religion only
if the government demonstrates that the action furthers a com-
pelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that interest.
There are many aspects and implications of RFRA that merit
attention, most of which are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment.42 The important point here is that although RFRA re-
quires a compelling state interest to justify a government action
that "substantially burdens" an individual's free exercise right, it
does' not resolve the Court's incomplete conception of religious
exercise itself. There is nothing in RFRA that changes, or even
addresses, the ingrained judicial misconceptions of minority reli-
gions discussed above. In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee
specifically stated that it expected "that the courts will look to
free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in deter-
mining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially
burdened and the least restrictive means have been employed in
furthering a compelling governmental interest."' Thus, RFRA
provides no additional guidance for avoiding the two main points
of judicial manipulation prior to Smith, namely, what constitutes
a "compelling" state interest and how one determines whether a
41 See 139 Cong Rec H2363 (May 11, 1993); 139 Cong Rec S14471 (Oct 27, 1993).
42 These include questions of constitutionality, legislative intent, and statutory inter-
pretation, as well as more general inquiries into the comparative advantages of courts and
legislatures as protectors of religious liberties.
For a fuller discussion of RFRA, see Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 BYU L Rev 73 (discussing the merits
and constitutionality of RFRA); Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1437-44 (cited in note 5) (arguing
that RFRA, although constitutional, is ineffective, is bad policy, and might even hurt
religious minorities); Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of
Employment Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 Wash & Lee
L Rev 135, 151-55 (1994) (concluding that neither Smith nor RFRA is adequately tied to a
textual interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause).
43 S Rep No 103-111, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 8-9 (1993). See also 139 Cong Rec S6464
(May 25, 1993) (statement of Sen Welistone).
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religious exercise has been "substantially burdened." As a result,
RFRA does nothing to resolve the current judicial failure to ade-
quately recognize and respect the core role religious practice
plays in shaping and expressing conceptions of identity.
C. The Nature of the Court's Misconception of Religious Exercise
Exposing the manipulability of the Court's free exercise doc-
trines raises the question of why courts so frequently weighted
the balance to virtually ensure that religious claimants, particu-
larly religious minorities with unconventional practices, would
lose. Although no single explanation is dispositive, several possi-
bilities provide a partial response. These include a "floodgates"
fear that a plethora of future, often unfounded, claims await
judicial decision makers once the accomodation process begins,
coupled with a perceived difficulty in distinguishing between
meritorious and fraudulent free exercise claims," and a recogni-
tion that while a few exemptions from a particular law might not
threaten the state's ability to achieve its legitimate goals, a large
number of exemptions pose just such a threat."
There is good evidence that these judicial fears are largely
unfounded. First, it is not uncommon for religious claimants,
finding their exemption request rejected by courts, to gain subse-
quently the same exemption from the legislature.46 Significantly,
none of these exemptions has led to the type of "floodgates" prob-
lems anticipated by the courts. ' Second, as several commenta-
tors have noted, if a great many potential claimants were likely
to seek exemptions from a particular law, it is highly unlikely
that such a law would pass in the first place.4" Thus, allowing
religious exemptions is unlikely to undermine substantially the
effectiveness of government policy-making.
See, for example, Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503, 510-13 (1986) (Stevens
concurring) (arguing that possible future and extreme claims for religious exemptions
from military dress code justified the denial of the more reasonable claim before the
Court).
' Justice Scalia's fear in Smith regarding individuals becoming "a law unto them-
selves" is illustrative of this point. See 494 US at 885.
'" For a general review of legislative exemptions, see Ryan, 78 Va L Rev at 1445-55
(cited in note 5). The Court's rejection of a Jewish serviceman's claim for an exemption
from the military's dress code to allow the wearing of a yarmulke in Goldman, 475 US
503, and its subsequent overturning by Congress provide a most enlightening example.
See text accompanying notes 100-09.
Again, Goldman is illuminating. See text accompanying notes 107-09.
See McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1147-48 (cited in note 21). See also Stephen
Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L Rev 299, 313-15.
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Although not as easy to identify, another potential explana-
tion must be considered. Whether the result of cultural insensi-
tivity, bias, or some more benign factor, courts have adopted a
narrow conception of religious exercise that often fails to account
for the fundamental role religious practice plays in developing
and expressing individual and group conceptions of identity and
that even more frequently fails to provide minority religions with
the same degree of protection enjoyed by mainstream Christiani-
ty. In other words, they underestimate the importance of the
religious practice to the individual or group affected, particularly
if those practices are outside of the mainstream Judeo-Christian
tradition. This incomplete understanding of religious exercise
manifests itself in several ways. First, courts are skeptical to-
ward claims involving unconventional religious practices. In the
Native American sacred site cases, for example, requiring a
showing of "indispensability" demonstrates a judicial failure to
appreciate the role sacred land sites play in Native American
worship practices and, more importantly for the present analysis,
in shaping and expressing Native American religious identity.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Sequoyah is a particularly
good example of the judiciary's failure to account for the identity-
generative and expressive functions of Native American religious
practices.49 In rejecting a challenge to the flooding of govern-
ment-owned sacred sites, the court stated:
The claim of centrality of the Valley to the practice of the
traditional Cherokee religion ... is missing from this case.
The overwhelming concern of the affiants appears to be
related to the historical beginnings of the Cherokees and
their cultural development. It is damage to tribal and family
folklore and traditions, more than particular religious obser-
vances, which appears to be at stake:... [T]hese are not
interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 50
One is left wondering with whose "particular religious obser-
vances" the court was comparing the Cherokee practices.
Both the court's cultural bias and its incomplete understand-
ing of the diversity and depth of religious exercise appear in its
relegation to the status of mere "folklore" what to the claimants
lay at the very core of their worship practices. Ironically, what
For the facts of Sequoyah, see text accompanying note 30.
620 F2d at 1164-65 (emphasis added).
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the court dismissed as folklore and tradition, and left unprotected
by the Free Exercise Clause, may in fact be the critical element
not only of Native American worship, but of the ability of Native
Americans to develop, express, and perpetuate their distinctive
religious identity.5' Any conception of religious exercise that dis-
counts practices so central to individual and group religious iden-
tity is woefully incomplete and is tantamount to the establish-
ment of state orthodoxy considered anathema by the Supreme
Court.
52
This incomplete understanding of religious exercise helps
explain not only why so many claims of religious minorities were
rejected by the courts but also why the claims of others were so
successful. Unquestionably, the single most successful class of
free exercise cases has been unemployment compensation
claims.5" Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in Smith, unemploy-
ment compensation has been the only area in which the Court
has consistently applied anything that resembles a genuine com-
pelling state interest standard.' Although the importance of the
benefit at stake and the absence of any apparent state interests
in denying the benefits offer a partial explanation, unemployment
compensation claims have had unparalleled success in part be-
cause there is clear evidence of the centrality and significance of
the religious practice in question. Simply put, it is difficult to
question the centrality of a claimant's beliefs when she is willing
to sacrifice her profession and livelihood rather than compromise
her devotion. Because other claims do not provide such unequivo-
cal evidence of the important role that the practice plays for the
individual, members of religious minorities who assert them
rarely prevail.
The Court's flawed and incomplete understanding of religious
exercise, which underlies much of its free exercise jurisprudence,
rose to the surface in Smith. As if the devaluation of religious
rights implied by the majority's "free exercise plus" standard55
" See Comment, 24 NM L Rev at 338 (cited in note 29).
2 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion.").
' See, for example, Frazee v Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 US 829
(1989); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 US 136 (1987); Thomas v
Review Board, 450 US 707 (1981); Sherbert, 374 US 398.
See 494 US at 883-84.
Recall that Smith protects religious practices from otherwise valid laws only in the
"hybrid" cases where religious rights commingle with other protected rights. See text ac-
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was not enough, the Court exposed its narrow characterization of
religious exercise even more when it specifically held that the
Native American Church's sacramental use of peyote in its reli-
gious ceremonies did not "present such a hybrid situation, but a
free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activi-
ty."56 Amazingly, not a single Justice, not even those in dissent,
took issue with the majority's noncommunicative conclusion.
Apparently, every Justice on the Supreme Court failed to recog-
nize any expressive or communicative value in the Native Ameri-
can Church's formal sacramental ceremony, an established rite of
its worship services that has existed for generations." Such
nonrecognition is particularly surprising when one considers the
various other forms of conduct the courts have viewed as poten-
tially possessing expressive value. 8
Ironically, Justice Scalia, in Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc.,
argued that the appropriate definition of "inherently expressive
conduct" is activity "that is normally engaged in for the purpose
of communicating an idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone
else."59 One would be hard pressed to find a better example of
"inherently expressive conduct" under Justice Scalia's own stan-
dard than a formal religious ceremony such as the one at issue in
Smith. Yet in the religion context, the Court characterized the
sacramental peyote ceremony as lacking any communicative
value." Clearly, for members of the Native American Church,
the sacramental use of peyote is rich in symbolism and expres-
companying note 40.
494 US at 882 (emphasis added).
5' However, Justice Souter, in his significant concurring opinion in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S Ct 2217, 2244-45 (1993), rejected what he
termed the "hybrid exception" of Smith and specifically noted that "free speech and
associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote-smoking ritual."
' See, for example, Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 US 560 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(accepting that public nude dancing is "expressive conduct"); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397
(1989) (flag burning); Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
US 503 (1969) (wearing colored arm bands); United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 382
(1968) (assuming that the act of burning a draft card during an antiwar protest had a
communicative element in it sufficient to implicate the First Amendment, but allowing
conviction for the nonexpressive aspect of the act); Brown v Louisiana, 383 US 131 (1966)
(participating in a sit-in); Stromberg v California, 283 US 359 (1931) (flying a red flag).
But compare O'Brien, 391 US at 376 (stating that the Court will not "accept the view that
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea").
" 501 US 560, 577 n 4 (1991) (Scalia concurring).
One wonders whether a claim regarding the use of communion wine rather than
sacramental peyote would equally be treated as a "free exercise claim unconnected with
any communicative activity." Smith, 494 US at 882.
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sive content. If nothing else, it is a way in which believers gather
together to declare openly their identity as members of the
Church, a religion distinguished not only by beliefs, but also by
its unique worship practices. That the Supreme Court failed to
get the message does not make their religious conduct any less
expressive. Having slighted the expressive nature of the religious
conduct, the Court equally ignored the devastating effects the
prohibition of peyote could have on the formation of individual
and group identity within the Native American Church.
Thus, what is needed is not just a stricter balancing test, but
a fuller vision of what religious devotion and practice is all
about-one that takes into account the richly symbolic and ex-
pressive nature of religious practices for those who adhere to
them and the fundamental role such worship plays in defining
and communicating conceptions of identity. An approach empha-
sizing these elments might help fill the void created by the
Court's current conception of religious exercise. Odd as it perhaps
appears, proponents of a more vital Free Exercise Clause might
find the foundation of such an approach in the concept of "identi-
ty speech" recently developed in the area of sexual orientation
legal theory.
II. PARALLELS BETWEEN SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND RELIGION
Before examining these developments in the area of sexual
orientation legal theory, this Section explores the relevant paral-
lels between sexual orientation and religion, focusing on both
individual and group characteristics. In exploring these parallels,
however, care must be given not to overstate the similarities.
Important differences between these areas of law exist, most
notably in the interaction of the Establishment Clause with free
exercise jurisprudence, and in the possible lack of choice in se-
lecting one's sexual orientation-depending on how one views the
genetics/environment debate. Important limits on the analogy
also stem from the express constitutional source of protection for
religion.6
The purpose of sketching out the relevant parallels between
religion and sexual orientation is not to establish a formal analo-
gy between these diverse areas such that a conclusion reached in
6 Note, however, that arguably the same is true of race, but its grounding in the
Reconstruction amendments does not inhibit similar comparisons and analogies. See text
accompanying note 85.
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one must necessarily apply to the other. Rather, it is to provide a
background for the conclusion that proponents of a more vibrant
Free Exercise Clause should take notice of recent developments
in sexual orientation theory. Similar arguments in the religion
context might provide a basis for a fuller vision of what religious
exercise entails and hence greater protection of religious freedom.
Once the similarities of the claims are recognized, it is easier
to understand the possible merits of adapting identity speech
concepts to the free exercise arena. Indeed, the value of adapting
identity speech arguments to the free exercise realm remains sa-
lient, regardless of their eventual success or failure in sexual
orientation jurisprudence.
A. Fundamental to Identity
Perhaps the most important parallel between sexual orienta-
tion and religion is the fundamental role both appear to play in
shaping an individual's concept of identity and personhood.62
When one considers the strength with which claims of religious
or sexual preferences are held and their resistance to change by
rational discourse or other decision-making processes, one senses
that these are matters particularly ill suited for resolution by
democratic voting or scientific investigation. As one commentator
noted, "[m]ajority rule does not fit well with those kinds of be-
liefs; compromise does not fit a great deal better; and imposition
by legal authority from above on such beliefs is not likely to be
taken with equanimity."63 Consequently, government incursions
into these areas tend to have a more devastating effect on indi-
viduals than intrusions on other, less defining areas.
' Of course there may be several other classifications or interests, such as "south-
erner," "Mlan member," or "vegetarian," that may also play an important role in shaping
identities and yet receive no special constitutional protection. Some substantive, valuative
standards are needed to distinguish these nonprotected identity-generative elements from
those that warrant protection. However, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Suffice it to note that the existence of other nonprotected identity-generative
elements does not bear on the present analysis for at least two reasons. First, this Com-
ment does not argue that religion or sexual orientation should be protected because it is
fundamental to human identity, but that courts have not adequately considered religion's
fundamental role in shaping identity and that developments in sexual orientation theory
may provide the basis for greater protection. Second, as for religion, the explicit protection
of the Free Exercise Clause provides the substantive distinction necessary to distinguish
it from other elements of identity. For a thorough examination of the distinctive nature of
sexual orientation, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan L Rev 503, 519-20 (1994).
' Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus
Equality, 1993 BYU L Rev 7, 39.
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Of course, religion or sexuality is not important to everyone,
but then neither is procreation, family life, or other core auton-
omy concerns. One need not believe in God to acknowledge that
for many individuals the role religious beliefs play in their lives
is of unparalleled value. The same holds true for sexuality and
sexual orientation. Both are intimately involved in many of the
core experiences of existence, including marriage, intimacy, and
procreation.
However, recognizing the role religion or sexual orientation
plays in defining individual identity as a way of distinguishing
either from other characteristics, while descriptively accurate,
has important practical and normative consequences. In particu-
lar, such a recognition singularly implicates issues of equality.
In the area of sexual orientation, equality norms are often
seen as cutting against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. If gay, lesbian, and bisexual orientations serve the
same identity-generative function that heterosexuality does for
the majority of individuals, then both formal and substantive
equality argue that they be treated in the same way." Recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages and the provision of health care, dis-
ability, and other benefits to same-sex spouses are just a few
results such equality norms compel.65
In the area of religion, however, the equality analysis is
more complex. For example, several commentators have argued
that exempting religiously motivated conduct from otherwise
generally applicable laws while denying exemptions for the same
conduct undertaken for other reasons violates the neutrality
required by the Constitution." But, in large part, the determi-
' Note that this "sameness" argument is by no means uncontroversial. Some view
gay and lesbian orientation as unnatural, immoral, or deviant, and therefore not the same
as heterosexuality. Others argue that the assumption that sexual orientation is a defining
characteristic of personhood depends on and reinforces rigid sexual categories that further
the oppression of those defined as different. See Note, Custody Denials to Parents in
Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 Harv L Rev 617, 622-23
(1989).
,'See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 Harv L Rev
1181, 1198-99 (1994) (arguing that failure to extend to same-sex couples such benefits
accompanying marital status as tax, inheritance, insurance, welfare, pension, spousal
support, custody, and adoption rights "violate[s] fundamental principles of equal recogni-
tion and personal autonomy, penalize[s] egalitarian caretaking relationships, and re-
inforce[s] ... gender stereotypes"). For a catalogue of similar state policies and a response
to them, see Developments in the Law, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv L Rev
1508, 1519-21 (1989).
' See, for example, Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 319-23 (cited in note 6); Note, Em-
ployment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the State of Free Exercise
Doctrine, 12 SLU Pub L Rev 569 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager,
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nation of whether a special religious exemption conflicts with
equality principles turns on whether we are valuing formal or
substantive equality. 7 Although granting special treatment only
to religiously motivated conduct would be a clear violation of
formal equality, analysis under substantive equality might yield
a very different result." For the reasons discussed above, the
person whose religious life is invaded by a legal provision is not
similarly situated to the person for whom the provision has no
such effect.69 It is an odd equality indeed that insists on ignor-
ing the disparate impact of legal provisions on individuals so differ-
ently situated."
Interestingly, for some commentators religion's central role
in defining human identity creates a special threat to freedom.
According to this view, religious indoctrination causes competing
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct,
61 U Chi L Rev 1245, 1254-67 (1994).
' "Formal" and "substantive" are used here in accord with Justice Souter's concur-
ring opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S Ct 2217,
2241-42 (1993), which identified "formal neutrality" as barring only laws with an object to
discriminate against religion, and "substantive neutrality" as requiring a similar secular
object, but in addition providing religious exemptions for practices adversely affected by
formally neutral laws. Thus, a primary difference between formal and substantive neu-
trality is the latter's recognition and protection of substantive religious differences. Id. See
also Yoder, 406 US at 235 n 22, quoting Sherbert, 374 US tt 409 (stating that a religious
exemption to a general law "reflects nothing more than the government obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences"); Pepper, 1993 BYU L Rev at 49-55 (cited in
note 63) (discussing differences between formal and substantive neutrality in the context
of free exercise claims). In addition, Justice Souter identifies the Smith decision with
formal neutrality and the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine with substantive neutrality and con-
cludes that the latter is a correct interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S Ct at 2240-50 (Souter concurring).
' See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993, 1000-06 (1990) (examining various approaches to
neutrality, but concluding that "substantive" neutrality, which seeks to equalize and mini-
mize the disparate impact of government actions on those holding various beliefs, is most
consonant with the religion clauses). For an additional distinction between "formal" and
"facial" neutrality, see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S Ct at 2242 n 3 (Souter con-
curring).
For an interesting analysis of neutrality in the religion context, see Michael W.
McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,
56 U Chi L Rev 1, 35 (1989) (concluding that "a regulation is not neutral in an economic
sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater costs
on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities").
70 Moreover, under such an exemption doctrine, most of the purposes of governmental
action can still be reached; the exemption typically involves a very small group of be-
lievers while the law remains valid for all others. Indeed, if the exemption would be ap-
plicable to a substantial minority, it is unlikely the legal provision would have ever been
enacted. See Pepper, 1986 BYU L Rev at 313-15 (cited in note 48); McConnell, 57 U Chi L
Rev at 1147-48 (cited in note 21).
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belief systems to be seen as threats to an individual's sense of
self and therefore as something that must be attacked and, if
possible, eradicated.7' Persecution and intolerance are the inevi-
table results of adhesion to religious beliefs, regardless of how
peaceful and conciliatory the particular beliefs involved. Conse-
quently, rather than accommodating such beliefs, government
should enforce formal equality between religious and nonreligious
systems.72 However, for present purposes, the important point is
that regardless of whether one views it as an important element
of individual liberty or a dangerous threat to freedom, the central
role religion plays in defining human identity is undisputed.
B. Important Element of Conduct
Another parallel between religion and sexual orientation is
that both possess an important behavioral component. This ele-
ment of conduct distinguishes both areas from other common
classifications such as race and gender. Failure on the part of
courts, lawmakers, and many advocates to address adequately
this behavioral component has led to the creation of artificial
dichotomies between status or belief on one side and behavior on
the other-with the former considered inviolate and the latter
receiving little or no protection.73
Of course, such distinctions are little more than legal fictions
designed to shield a court or other decision maker from the unen-
viable task of adjudicating difficult issues in an open and honest
fashion. In reality, both religious belief and sexual orientation
are characteristics so intimately connected with human behavior
that they cannot be disentangled. Indeed, it is hardly enough to
say that identity defined by either naturally involves conduct or a
propensity to engage in a certain type of behavior: both can be
seen as a way of life, and it is the lifestyle that creates the iden-
tity and vice versa. Hence, when one is dealing with the conduct
that defines the identity, whether it be same-sex hand-holding or
"' See William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-Establishment, 1993 BYU L Rev
63, 69; Eisgruber and Sager, 61 U Chi L Rev at 1256-57 (cited in note 66).
' More specifically, formal equality under the Free Exercise Clause and a variation
on substantive equality under the Establishment Clause that allows, even insists on,
government endorsement of secularism and irreligious beliefs while strictly prohibiting
any attempt by religionists to use the political processes to reinforce their self-identity.
See Marshall, 1993 BYU L Rev at 68-71.
" For an example of this dichotomy in the religion context, see Reynolds, 98 US at
166; text accompanying notes 11-14. For a similar discussion in the sexual orientation
realm, see text accompanying notes 86-88.
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the sacramental use of peyote, one is dealing with the status or
identity itself.
C. Exiled from Public Discourse
Another parallel between sexual orientation and religion,
and one that is particularly significant, is that both are generally
accepted as intensely personal matters. Many conclude from this
that sexual and religious expression are not appropriate topics
for public discourse. This public/private argument underlies
many of the limitations on individual expression in these areas.
Several commentators have noted the way religion is privat-
ized and marginalized in contemporary society.74 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has declared on more than one occasion that
"[tihe Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice."75 Whether intended or not, the implication is that reli-
gion has little or nothing to offer to the public sphere.76
Proponents of protecting sexual orientation have similarly
argued that public/private distinctions have led to the expulsion
of sexual expression, particularly gay and lesbian expression,
from the public realm.77 Most prominent is the military's cur-
rent "don't ask, don't tell" policy on homosexuality, although
similar "no promo homo"75 policies have been in place in various
areas of public life for decades.79
D. Similar Group Characteristics
In addition to parallels on the level of the individual, reli-
gious groups, particularly religious minorities, have many of the
same group characteristics as gays and lesbians.0 These include
7 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!:
Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L Rev 163, 164-66; Stephen L.
Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law and Politics Trivialize Rel gious
Devotion (Basic Books, 1993).
"5 Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 625 (1971). See also Grand Rapids School District
v Ball, 473 US 373, 398 (1985) (quoting Lemon); Larkin v Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 US 116,
126 (1982) (same); Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388, 416 (1983) (same).
"' See Carter, Culture of Disbelief at 25 (arguing that contemporary culture pushes
religious individuals to keep their beliefs and particularly their unusual practices to them-
selves).
See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va L Rev 1695, 1702-16
(1993).
"' For a definition of "no promo homo" rules and a discussion of the term and its
development, see id.
9 Id.
'o Focusing some attention on the group characteristics of religion makes sense for at
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a history of discrimination and a lack of political power. Most
significantly, unlike race, gender, and ethnicity, membership in a
group defined by religion or sexual orientation is based on crite-
ria that, for the most part, are not visible to others. As a result,
the ability to express openly one's membership in the group is
essential to the group's continued vitality. Because, as discussed
above, the criteria that identifies one as a member of such a
group is so often intimately bound up with conduct or behavior of
some kind, the ability to openly practice this conduct is essential
to identification with the group.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN SEXUAL ORIENTATION THEORY
A. Bowers v Hardwick and its Aftermath
Recent developments in sexual orientation theory are best
understood as a reaction to the current state of the law. In many
respects, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v Hardwick8
has defined the nature of the current debate. Prior to Hardwick,
most advocates saw the newly articulated penumbral right to
privacy as the best hope of securing constitutional protections for
homosexual activities. However, after the Court's decision, propo-
nents of gay and lesbian rights found themselves searching for a
new constitutional provision on which to base protection.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Hardwick was the
way in which Justice White, writing for the Court, framed the
issue: "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 2 The Court's at-
tention was focused solely on the act of homosexual sodomy.
Some commentators have argued that this focus tends to equate
homosexual orientation with the act of sodomy, to the exclusion
of other aspects of homosexual identity." As will be explored
least two reasons. First, a religious life includes not only a profound connection to a
divinely inspired way of life, but also a profound connection to the community defined by
allegiance to that way of life. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional
Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 Harv L Rev 1468, 1472-75 (1984); Francis
Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989
Wis L Rev 99, 106-15; Pepper, 1993 BYU L Rev at 42 (cited in note 63). Second, although
their claims are typically adjudicated under the religion clauses, religious minorities are
at least potentially a suspect class under United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US
144, 152 n 4 (1938).8 478 US 186 (1986).
62 Id at 190. The problem with the Court's framing of the issue was that the statute
interpreted was a general ban on all sodomy regardless of the gender or sexual orienta-
tion of the participants. Id.
' See, for example, Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In
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below, such an act-centered focus has had important ramifica-
tions in the development of sexual orientation theory and the
divorcing of homosexual identity from homosexual conduct.
In the aftermath of Hardwick, the federal courts divided over
what has become known as the status/conduct debate, with most
courts ruling that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion could not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because it was constitutionally permissible
under Hardwick for a state to criminalize sodomy, and participa-
tion in sodomy defined homosexuals as a class." Left without a
privacy-based defense of homosexual conduct, advocates argued
that sexual orientation was first and foremost a status, not con-
tingent on any particular conduct. Thus, they argued for protec-
tion by analogizing to the traditionally recognized suspect classes
of race and gender." However, such analogies, by failing to rec-
ognize that sexual orientation, unlike the traditional suspect
classes, has at its core an important element of conduct, have
only exacerbated the artificial status/conduct dichotomies.
B. "No Promo Homo" and the Status/Conduct Debate
Many proponents of homosexual rights find themselves con-
strained into divorcing homosexual status from homosexual con-
duct. This is so partly because of the way the Court framed the
Hardwick holding and partly because of the forced analogies to
race and gender. The ban on military service by lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals is a particularly rich, although by no means
the only, example of how such artificial distinctions interact with
the concepts of identity, equality, and expression.
First, the rhetoric of the debate over the military ban mirrors
the debate about status and conduct generally. President Clinton
framed his position against the existing exclusionary rule as
opposition to discrimination "based solely on status." 6 In re-
sponse, congressional opponents like Senator Sam Nunn argued
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Va L Rev 1721, 1734-45 (1993).
' See generally Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 531
(1992) (discussing in detail both the origins of the status/conduct distinctions and the gaps
that have arisen in this discourse).
' See, for example, Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protec-
tion for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L Rev 915 (1989). See also Note,
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classifica-
tion, 98 Harv L Rev 1285 (1985).




that homosexual status could not exist independent of homosexu-
al sex acts.87
Second, the military has conceded that homosexual identity
does not affect a soldier's ability to perform in the military, ex-
cept to the extent the identity is expressed to others. General
Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
others testified that gays and lesbians had always served in the
military, and that their presence did not cause any problems as
long as they remained "in the closet."8 Indeed, the very name
given to the military's policy, "don't ask, don't tell," reveals that
it is designed to regulate expression of some kind.
Finally, only public declarations of homosexuality could trig-
ger enforcement of the ban, whether through statements or sym-
bolic acts. Thus, same-sex hand-holding or marriage, two public
expressions of sexual identity, are grounds for discharge unless
the individual can prove that he or she has no propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual sex. By contrast, hand-holding in
private or a private commitment to a lifelong homosexual rela-
tionship does not trigger investigation or penalty.
C. Identity, Expression, and Equality: The Concept of Identity
Speech
Commentators are increasingly recognizing the expressive
dimension of restrictions on gay and lesbian "conduct." As a re-
sult, several are arguing for protection under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause.89 This view stresses that our
First Amendment tradition is committed to assuring a safe haven
for individuals to develop and then to express their ideas, feel-
ings, and emotions in the manner that best suits them.9" In oth-
67 See Debbie Howlett, Senator Fears Gay Disaster, USA Today 10A (June 1, 1993).
' See Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Budget, Hearing before the House Committee on the
Budget, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 1, 45 (1992). Responding to the question of whether there was
any evidence of behavior problems as a result of the longstanding presence of gays and
lesbians in the military, General Powell replied:
No, because as a matter of fact they have kept, so-called in the closet. It is quite a
different thing when it is openly practiced or openly known throughout the force and
within the units. I think it makes very difficult management problems.
Id.
" See, for example, David Cole and William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to
Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 Harv CR-CL
L Rev 319 (1994) (developing a First Amendment basis for protecting public and private
homosexual acts); Hunter, 79 Va L Rev at 1696, 1716-19 (cited in note 77) (exploring the
expressive nature of homosexual practices).
'o For an example of judicial recognition of this developmental function, see Cohen v
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er words, certain forms of expression are preserved from state
manipulation not just for their utility to social organization but
because of their importance to human development. Foremost
among these First Amendment approaches is the concept of
"identity speech."
The theory of identity speech combines two powerful aspects
of sexual orientation arguments: the fundamental role sexual
orientation plays in defining identity and the expressive nature of
the "conduct" involved. Publicly declaring one's status or mem-
bership in a group that is central to one's identity, even if that
expression takes the form of openly engaging in the activities
that define group membership, is at the core of free speech. As
one commentator put it, "[self-representation of one's sexual
identity necessarily includes a message that one has not merely
come out, but that one intends to be out-to act on and live out
that identity."9 Indeed, the argument goes, given the injury suf-
fered by an individual when such self-identifying expression is
prohibited, it should be among the most protected forms of
speech.
"Identity" in the theory of identity speech is a complex con-
cept. It transcends the dialogic rhetoric of status and conduct
that typically dominates discussions in this area and encom-
passes explanation and representation of the self. Thus, the gap
between status and conduct is bridged by an emphasis on the ex-
pressive right to represent one's status or membership in a group
that is itself defined largely by the type of activities in which its
members are engaged.
The fact that the activities at issue in the sexual orientation
area, ranging from public hand-holding and kissing to private
sodomy, might only be symbolic of ideas and attitudes rather
than literal statements of position in the public debate about
California, 403 US 15, 24 (1971):
The constitutional right of free expression is... designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,... in the hope that use
of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
See also Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) ("Those who
won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties."); Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 619 (1984) ("Pro-
tecting [highly personal relationships] from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept
of liberty.").
" Hunter, 79 Va L Rev at 1696 (cited in note 77).
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sexuality does not necessarily diminish their expressive value.
"Public" debate has never been limited solely to such obvious
forms of speech as books, articles, speeches, and picket signs; it
has always included symbolic gestures such as dancing, visual
art and advertising, public demonstrations, clothing, and physical
conduct.92
Advocates of this identity speech approach generally track
the Supreme Court's two-step method of determining the consti-
tutionality of statutes regulating expressive conduct. This analy-
sis first asks whether the conduct involved is expressive: whether
it is intended to communicate and whether it is likely to be un-
derstood by an audience as communicative. 3 Given the wide
range of activities that carry some form of expressive content, it
is not surprising that this first inquiry has a very low threshold.
The second step in the analysis of expressive conduct is the
critical one: it asks whether the government's regulatory purpose
is related to the conduct's expressive elements.94 Thus, when
Texas sought to outlaw flag burning, the Court found that the
state's primary interest was in suppressing the messages associ-
ated with such conduct and subjected the law to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.95 As the Court put it, the determinative
question was whether the state's interest in banning the conduct
was "related to the suppression of expression."96 By contrast,
when protesters seeking to dramatize the plight of the homeless
by sleeping in Lafayette Park challenged the National Park
Service's prohibition on sleeping in public parks, the Court, ap-
plying minimal scrutiny, upheld the ban.97 It found that the
government's interest in preventing sleeping in parks was based
on the safety and upkeep of parks and had nothing to do with the
message the protesters sought to communicate.98
Although conceding that private homosexual conduct does
not directly contribute to public debate in the way that public
affirmations of homosexuality do, those arguing for protection of
gays and lesbians on First Amendment grounds nonetheless
See note 58.
See Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 404-05 (1989); Spence v Washington, 418 US
405, 409-10 (1974).
' See United States v Eichman, 496 US 310, 315-18 (1990); Johnson, 491 US at 407.
See also RA.V. v City of St. Paul, 112 S Ct 2538, 2544 (1992).
" Johnson, 491 US at 407, 410.
Id at 407.
Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288, 289 (1984).
" Id at 297-99.
1995] 1267
The University of Chicago Law Review
assert that such private activities play an indispensable part in
shaping the public debate. Because homosexuals "explore and
develop their sexual identity through private sexual conduct, that
private conduct is critical to their ability to take part as lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals in public life."99 The primary effect,
then, of such "no promo homo" legal mechanisms as the military
exclusion and state sodomy laws is to keep homosexuality "in the
closet," both hidden from the public and incapable of contributing
to public discourse and politics.
IV. TOWARD A FULLER VISION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
This Comment has argued that courts systematically under-
value the rights of religious minorities by adopting an incomplete
understanding of religious exercise as the starting point of their
free exercise analysis. Consequently, whatever balancing stan-
dard is being applied, the outcome is inevitably skewed in favor
of the state's interest. This is particularly true in the case of a
religious minority whose practices are sufficiently out of the
mainstream to make it difficult for judges to identify their prac-
tices as religious worship and easy to doubt the depth and sincer-
ity of the convictions behind them. By adopting an approach
similar to that of identity speech espoused in the sexual orienta-
tion field, advocates of a more vibrant Free Exercise Clause can
provide courts with a fuller vision of religious liberty and provide
a more coherent way of articulating the injury that occurs to an
individual when her free exercise rights are infringed.
A. Applying Identity Speech Concepts to Religious Claims:
Revisiting Goldman v Weinberger
This Subsection re-examines the Court's decision in Goldman
v Weinberger... in order to illustrate the application of "identity
speech" analysis to free exercise claims. The Goldman Court
rejected an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer's claim that the
Free Exercise Clause gave him a constitutional right to wear a
yarmulke as part of his military attire. The case provides a use-
ful analysis for present purposes in part because it involves the
military context, where most of the details of the identity speech
arguments of gay rights advocates have been developed.
' Cole and Eskridge, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 329 (cited in note 89).
10 475 US 503 (1986).
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Before reworking Goldman under an identity speech ap-
proach, certain differences in the analysis between sexual orien-
tation and religion should be identified. First, unlike claims of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which typically
seek to void an entire policy or law, claims of religious exercise
generally seek only to exempt a religious minority from an other-
wise neutral rule.
Second, because the remedy sought is typically narrower-a
small exception rather than voiding the entire rule-the other-
wise necessary showing that the state's purpose in regulating the
conduct relates to its expressive element is less critical. Instead,
the proper question is whether there is a less restrictive alterna-
tive the state could adopt to carry out its legitimate interests
without infringing on the religious exercise of the minority. Simi-
larly, because the religious claimant is not typically asking for
the policy or law as a whole to be declared unconstitutional, the
proper application of a compelling state interest standard asks
not if the state has a compelling interest in propagating or en-
forcing the rule as a whole, but if it has a compelling interest in
denying the exemption.'0 ' Thus, the narrower nature of the reli-
gious exemption claim requires a narrower framing of the state's
interest. Such proportionality is vital to the proper application of
any balancing standard adopted by the Court.
As for the interests at stake in Goldman, the military had
two principal arguments. First, the military argued that it has a
strong interest in promoting uniformity of appearance, which in
turn promotes esprit de corps and obedience to authority.0 2
Second, it claimed that if it granted a yarmulke exception to
Jewish servicemen, which both sides seemed to concede was
"unobtrusive," it would soon be flooded with similar claims from
various other religious groups; and while a yarmulke may not
seem obtrusive to a Jew, "neither does a turban to a Sikh, a
saffron robe to a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, [or]
dreadlocks to a Rastafarian." °3 This is, of course, the classic
slippery slope argument that is repeatedly seen in religious ex-
emption cases."'
,02 See Yoder, 406 US at 221.
'c' Goldman, 475 US at 408-09.
10 Id at 519 (Brennan dissenting).
'. For a discussion of the "slippery slope" argument in religious exemption cases, see
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 Harv L Rev 933, 947 (1989).
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However, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion adds a differ-
ent and more interesting twist to the standard parade-of-
horribles argument. Uniformity, he says, has a more important
dimension: "[it is the interest in uniform treatment for the mem-
bers of all religious faiths.""5 For Justice Stevens, basing the
determination of permissible religious attire on the "neutral,
completely objective standard" of visibility is the superior rule,
even if it forecloses a multitude of religious accommodations that
would have no significant adverse impact on the military's ex-
pressed interests of protecting esprit de corps and obedience to
authority.0 0 This view pushed neutrality to its logical extreme:
because some religious minorities might want to wear "so ex-
treme, so unusual, or so faddish an image," military officials will
be forced into denying some religious apparel based on such
nonneutral and nonobjective criteria as "neat and conservative";
to avoid this nonneutral result, all visible religious attire must be
banned, regardless of how religiously compelled or how inoffen-
sive to military interests.' 7
By grounding his argument in the values of "neutrality" and
"objectivity," Justice Stevens makes his position sound quite
persuasive. There are, however, two main flaws in his approach,
one empirical, and the other principled. Justice Blackmun makes
the empirical challenge in his dissent: "[the Air Force simply has
not shown any reason to fear that a significant number of enlist-
ed personnel and officers would request religious exemptions that
could not be denied on neutral grounds."0 8 Interestingly, short-
ly after the Court's decision, Congress revised the military's dress
code to allow for religious apparel so long as it did not "interfere
with the performance of the member's military duties" and is
"neat and conservative."' 9 In the wake of this legislative action,
the military does not appear to have been swamped with
Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi servicemen clamoring for
their rights to wear saffron robes, nor has its ability to respond
to conflicts around the globe been impaired.
10 Goldman, 475 US at 512 (Stevens concurring).
6 Id at 513.
'0' Id at 512-13.
0 Id at 527 (Blackmun dissenting).
'- Pub L No 100-180, 101 Stat 1086, codified at 10 USC § 774 (1988). The "neat and
conservative" standard follows Justice Brennan's suggestion and is modeled after the
military's standard for the wearing of jewelry. See Goldman, 475 US at 520 (Brennan dis-
senting), quoting AFR 35-10, J 1-12b(1)(b) (1978).
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The concept of identity speech, however, provides the ground-
work for a more principled challenge to the visibility standard
Justice Stevens supported. The military's decision to draw the
line at visible manifestations of religious apparel and its concern
over the way others would interpret such apparel illustrates that
what the military was really attempting to regulate, or at least
what it had the effect of regulating, was the public expression of
a service member's religious identity."0 One doubts whether
the Court would have adopted such a deferential stance if the
regulation at issue prohibited service members from openly dis-
cussing their religious affiliations with other service members or
civilians. Clearly, such a regulation could be portrayed as fur-
thering the important interests of promoting uniformity, esprit de
corps, and obedience to authority. Yet the visibility standard
approved by the Court has much the same effect as a ban on
open discussion, although admittedly to a lesser degree.
Certainly, the wearing of religious apparel as part of one's
religious practice and worship qualifies as "expressive conduct"
for purposes of the First Amendment."' Equally clear is that
the military's selection of the visibility standard was related to
the expressive element of the conduct being regulated. Thus, at
the very least, Goldman qualifies as a "free exercise plus" case
under Smith." Yet there was no discussion of either free
speech rights or the expressive element of the religious exercise
involved.
Applying "identity speech" rationales to expressive religious
practices, such as the wearing of yarmulkes by a Jewish service-
man, also has several more subtle implications."' First, penal-
izing the self-identifying religious practices of religious minorities
effectively nullifies any protection under equality principles. In
this instance, it is realistically impossible to separate religious
practice from status. Such a penalty makes the promise of equali-
110 Indeed, the only justifications the government gave for its visibility test were based
on what visible religious apparel communicates to others. What made Goldman's wearing
of a yarmulke objectionable to the military, while less visible attire (such as sacred Mor-
mon undergarments) was not, was that it sent a message to all who came in contact with
him that he was a member of a particular religion. Rather than just a serviceman, he was
a Jewish serviceman, creating an alleged subversion of uniformity and espirit de corps.
... Compare with the expressive conduct cases reviewed in note 58.
" See text accompanying note 40.
.. The analysis here is patterned after that made by Nan Hunter in the area of mili-
tary regulation of homosexual conduct. See Hunter, 79 Va L Rev at 1718-19 (cited in note
77).
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ty a sham, effectively denying religious protection to anyone
devout enough to openly practice his or her religion.
Second, suppression of self-identifying religious practices
leads to a compelled falsehood, a violation of the principle that an
individual has the right not to speak as well as to speak.
Given the current baseline of exiling religion and religious prac-
tices from public life, in the absence of religious expression to the
contrary, most persons in the public realm will be presumed to be
secularists, or in the alternative, mainstream Protestants. To
compel silence, then, is in effect to force religious minorities who
are neither to lie.
Lastly, like forced speech, the collective, communal impact of
forced silence amounts to more than an accumulation of viola-
tions of individual integrity. It creates a form of state ortho-
doxy."' If expressing religious practices can communicate ideas
and viewpoints that dissent from majoritarian or official norms,
then the silencing of certain religious identities has the opposite,
totalitarian effect of enforcing conformity. In that sense, religion
generally, and minority religions in particular, are not merely, or
either, status or conduct. They are also, independently, ideas. In
this sense, it is the role of religion in the realm of public dis-
course itself that is at stake in such battles.
B. Limitations on the Application of Identity Speech Analysis to
Religious Claims
In arguing for a focus on the expressive nature of the con-
duct involved, care must be given not to overemphasize the ex-
pressive function of religious exercise. Although this Comment
argues that most religious practices are deeply symbolic and
expressive in nature, particularly in their role of defining and
representing individual identity, that current judicial standards
fall woefully short of recognizing these expressive elements, and
that an approach that emphasizes these excluded elements would
provide a more complete understanding of the free exercise right,
it does not argue that we should collapse religious liberty into
traditional speech analysis.
Although such proposals have been made,"' free exercise
114 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that West Virginia could not require that Jehovah's Witness school children
participate in the pledge of allegiance). See also note 52.
... See note 52.
16 See, for example, William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
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and free speech rights are sufficiently distinct that the wholesale
adoption of traditional speech analysis into the free exercise
realm would ultimately be injurious to religious liberties."
First, traditional speech protections are often seen as instrumen-
tal in nature-concerned primarily with the discovery of truth in
the marketplace of ideas-while religious protections are general-
ly more concerned with the dignitary and autonomy interests of
the individual."' Furthermore, at times this dignitary or devel-
opmental function is treated as a secondary attribute of free
speech, one that is more easily outweighed by important state
interests." Likewise, speech on matters of "public concern" is
typically more protected than speech regarding purely private
interests."
Second, and more importantly, the First Amendment specifi-
cally singles out religion among all the various belief systems
and world views as entitled to special protection, while tradition-
al speech doctrines provide no such favored status for religiously
expressive conduct. The inclusion of religion in the First Amend-
ment demonstrates that religion is an independent and unique
factor in our political-legal system. Thus, application of the neu-
trality norms of free speech to the religion clauses seems clearly
anomalous."2 The Free Exercise Clause grants religious belief
systems a different constitutional status than nonreligious belief
systems. The Constitution is no more neutral in this respect than
Exercise as Expression, 67 Minn L Rev 545, 546-47 (1983) (arguing that Free Exercise
Clause protections should be limited to be consistent with the entire First Amendments
emphasis on protecting communicative activities); Pepper, 1981 Utah L Rev at 367-68
(cited in note 18).
117 For a similar view, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Up-
date and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 685, 719-20 (1992) (rejecting an
approach collapsing free exercise into traditional speech analysis).
"8 In part, this Comment argues that traditional speech concerns include the digni-
tary or developmental interests of the individual and that much of the expressive element
of religious devotion could be considered core political speech.
"' See Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on
the First Amendment § 2.03 (Matthew Bender, 1994) (noting that the speech interest "may
often be found subordinate to the anti-speech interest where only the self-fufill-
ment... function is served by the speech"). See also Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 146
(1983) ("When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment.").
120 See Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, 472 US 749, 758-59 (1985). Note,
however, that if properly framed, many expressive elements of private religious practice
could be deemed to touch on matters of public concern.
21 See text accompanying notes 66-70.
1995] 1273
The University of Chicago Law Review'
it is neutral between expressive and nonexpressive conduct or
property and nonproperty interests. 2 The same is true of the
Establishment Clause. Government entanglement with secular
belief systems does not implicate the same constitutional con-
cerns as entanglement with religious belief systems.'
In addition, the application of identity speech rationales to
free exercise jurisprudence does not change the nature of Estab-
lishment Clause concerns. Thus, a large portion of decisions re-
main unaffected. However, a fuller vision of religious exercise
might influence a court's balancing of establishment and free
exercise interests, particularly if the balance is a close one.
CONCLUSION
In the discussion over the proper level of scrutiny courts
should use in determining free exercise claims, not enough atten-
tion has been paid to the meaning of religious exercise itself.
Current and past case law illustrates that the Supreme Court
has adopted an incomplete understanding of religious exercise
that has had a disparate impact on religious minorities. Refocus-
ing the Court's attention on the deeply symbolic and expressive
nature of religious devotion and the fundamental role such devo-
tion plays in defining individual and group conceptions of identity
provides the basis for a fuller vision of the free exercise right and
a more systematic way of articulating the injury that occurs to an
individual whose free exercise rights are infringed. In the pro-
cess, it should bring the Court's free exercise jurisprudence more
into line with the realities of religious devotion and experience.
' See, for example, Yoder, 406 US at 215-216 (granting an exemption to compulsory
attendance laws for Amish claimants, but noting that a similar claim based on nonreli-
gious philosophical or personal grounds would be denied).
12 See Smith v Board of School Commissioners, 827 F2d 684, 694-95 (11th Cir 1987)
(holding that selection of school textbooks that "advanced" secular humanism did not vio-
late Establishment Clause because it had secular purpose and "neutral" effects).
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